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In an interesting recent article Walter Slaje (2001) has examined the way salt was 
conceived of in ancient and classical India. He comes to the conclusion that “[s]alt was 
conceived of as being ... substantially the same as water, albeit in a particular crystallized 
state of water, similar to, e.g., ice or hailstones as frozen states of water” (p. 42). In support 
of this conclusion Slaje presents some textual passages from classical philosophical 
literature. One of these passages will here be reconsidered. It may not provide the backing it 
is believed to provide. 
 The passage concerned occurs in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha of Praßastapåda (WI 
§34-40), the classical presentation of the Vaiße∑ika philosophy. Here, as Slaje observes (p. 
35), in treating the elemental substance ‘water’ Praßastapåda gives a fuller account of all the 
perceivable manifestations (vi∑aya) of water. This account includes “rivers (sarit) and the 
ocean (samudra)”.1 On the following page Slaje concludes from this that samudra must 
have been regarded as a particular, objective manifestation of the elemental substance 
‘water’: “although salty tasting, the ocean (samudra) was considered water in its very 
essence”. This is remarkable, he thinks, for elsewhere in the same passage of the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha the only taste allowed for water is ‘sweet’ (madhura).2 Slaje 
believes that “[t]he clue to this problem of sweetness comprising salty taste .. might be 
found in Jaina sources where ‘saltiness’ has been treated as a variety of ‘sweetness’ since 
canonical times”. He also strongly suggests that the very mention of the ocean in the 
enumeration of perceivable manifestations of water may be due to the different taste which 
water from the ocean has, viz. salty. In other words, salty water is water in its very essence, 
and solid salt is a particular crystallised form of water. 
 I do not think that the Padårthadharmasa∫graha allows of such an interpretation. It 
overlooks some of the fundamental tenets of Vaiße∑ika ontology. Let me repeat here the 
main points, which I have more elaborately dealt with elsewhere.3 
                                                
1 WI §40: vi∑ayas tu saritsamudrahimakarakådi˙. 
2 WI §36: ßuklamadhuraß¥tå eva rËparasasparßå˙. 
3 See Bronkhorst, 1992; 1999: 24 ff. 
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 All that exists is either substance (dravya), quality (guˆa), action (karman), 
universal (såmånya/jåti), particular (viße∑a) or inherence (samavåya). Nothing that exists 
can combine these so-called categories (padårtha): nothing can e.g. be both substance and 
quality, for this would imply the fault of jåtisaµkara, ‘mixture of universals’. Most of these 
categories have subdivisions. In the case of substance, for example, there are nine 
subdivisions, nine kinds of substance; these include the five elements: earth, water, fire, 
wind, ether. Once again, nothing can be more than one of these at the same time; nothing, 
e.g., can be both earth and water. These elements again have further subdivisions; in the 
case of earth these subdivisions are particularly numerous: they cover most of the objects 
denoted by common nouns, such as trees, pots, etc. etc. Trees in their turn can be divided 
into different kinds of trees. But however far one descends in this ontological scheme 
(which looks like a genealogical tree), the prohibition of jåtisaµkara is valid at every single 
level. For example, a certain tree cannot be both a Íiµßapå tree and a Palåßa tree, a beech 
and a fir. 
 This way of interpreting reality raises some obvious questions. Many, perhaps most, 
of the things we are familiar with do combine several categories. The most obvious 
example is the body, be it human or animal, or indeed the body of a tree. The body consists 
(from a Vaiße∑ika point of view) of earth and water (plus other substances, such as the 
digestive fire). How then is a body to be categorised, given that it cannot belong to more 
than one category? The Vaiße∑ika takes in this respect the following position: the body is 
earth, whereas water and whatever other substances there may be are not part of the body: 
they are merely connected with it (through saµyoga ‘contact’, not samavåya ‘inherence’). 
This is equally true of the organs: they are connected with the body though contact. This 
applies even to the organ of touch.4 That is to say, normal bodies are earth in essence, but 
they are in contact with other substances. 
 Because real physical bodies always combine different elements, Praßastapåda does 
not hesitate to speak of bodies of water, fire, and wind. All of them are fortified with earth, 
which does not however strictly belong to those bodies; it is merely in contact with them.5 
The bodies themselves are, in their very essence, water, fire and wind respectively. 
                                                
4 WI §192: tvagindriyaßar¥rayo˙ ... yute∑v åßraye∑u samavåyo 'st¥ti paraspareˆa saµyoga˙ siddha˙. 
5 See for the water body WI §38: ßar¥ram ayonijam eva varuˆaloke pårthivåvayavopa∑†ambhåc 
copabhogasamartham; for the fire-body WI §45: ßar¥ram ayonijam evådityaloke 
pårthivåvayavopa ∑†ambhåc copabhogasamartham; for the wind-body WI §52: ayonijam eva ßar¥raµ 
marutåµ loke pårthivåvayavopa∑†ambhåc  copabhogasamartham.  
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 Another example is gold. Gold, Praßastapåda tells us, is a form of fire.6 However, he 
also tells us that the touch of fire is hot and hot only.7 Yet the touch of gold is not hot. And 
gold has other features, too, that do not belong to fire but which do belong to earth, such as 
taste. How is one to explain this? Praßastapåda has his answer ready: such other qualities 
inhere in the other substance or substances with which fire is here in contact.8 In his 
account of creation Praßastapåda describes the golden egg from which the universe is 
created as made from fire atoms together with earth atoms.9 Once again, gold is fire in its 
very essence, but it is accompanied by one or more other elements that do not strictly 
speaking belong to it, but that are in contact with it. 
 Another point has to be emphasised here. In order to find out what entities exists, 
Vaiße∑ika uses a simple instrument: the words of the Sanskrit language. Indeed, 
Praßastapåda draws sometimes ontological conclusions from the use of certain words.10 
With few exceptions, the nouns of the Sanskrit language provide a good inventory of the 
substances that exist. Most of these substances are, of course, earth from the point of view 
of the Vaiße∑ikas: trees, pots, houses, etc. etc. There are far fewer common nouns that 
denote objects constituted of water, fire and wind. But there are some. In the case of water, 
there are words like river, lake, pond, and ocean. This, and nothing else, is the reason why 
Praßastapåda enumerates rivers and the ocean as manifestations of water. 
 With the preceding reflections in mind, we can try to apply Vaiße∑ika-style 
reasoning to the ocean: where does it fit in the ontological scheme of that school? The first 
observation to be made is that the ocean exists, because there is a word for it. Once we 
know it exists, it has to be determined whether it is a substance, a quality, or any of the 
remaining principal categories. The answer is not problematic: the ocean is a substance. 
Which substance? Again, there are no serious candidates apart from water. Being water, the 
taste of the ocean should be sweet (madhura). It is however salty. How is that possible? 
According to Praßastapåda's Padårthadharmasa∫graha there are six tastes, two among them 
being ‘sweet’ (madhura) and ‘salty’ (lavaˆa).11 Most of the substances have no taste at all; 
                                                
6 WI §47: åkarajaµ [teja˙] suvarˆådi. 
7 WI §43: u∑ˆa eva sparßa˙. 
8 WI §47: tatra saµyuktasamavåyåd rasådyupalabdhir iti. The Vyomavat¥ (Vy I p. 87 l. 8) explains: 
saµyuktaµ suvarˆådau pårthivaµ dravyam, tatra samavetå rasådaya upalabhyante. The Nyåyakandal¥ (Ny p. 
117 l. 9 - p. 118 l. 2) goes further: kathaµ tarhi gandharasayor anu∑ˆåß¥tasparßasya ca gurutvasya copalabdhir 
ata åha: tatreti/ bhoginåm ad®∑†avaßena bhËyasåµ pårthivåvayavånåm upa∑†ambhåd anudbhËtarËpasparßaµ 
piˆ∂¥bhåvayogyaµ suvarˆådikam årabhyate, tatra pårthivadravyasamavetå ime rasådayo g®hyante/ 
9 WI §59: taijasebhyo 'ˆubhya˙ pårthivaparamåˆusahitebhyo mahad aˆ∂am årabhyate. 
10 See the references given in note 3, above. 
11 WI §119: raso ... madhuråmlalavaˆatiktaka†uka∑åyabhedabhinna˙. 
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water is sweet and nothing else; only earth can have all the six tastes.12 The conclusion is 
straightforward: the salty taste of the ocean cannot but be explained by the presence of earth 
that is in contact with the ocean. More precisely: because different manifestations of earth 
can have different tastes, there must be a form of earth in the ocean (i.e., in contact with the 
ocean) which is salty. Whether this form of earth is the substance salt or something else that 
has a salty taste, the Praßastapåda does not permit us to know. What we can know is that 
this admixture of earth does not strictly belong to the ocean, that it is only in contact with it. 
The salty taste, too, therefore, does not strictly belong to the ocean, just as the cold touch of 
gold does not really belong to the essence of gold, which is fire. 
 This is, as far as I can see, the correct Vaiße∑ika way of accounting for the saltiness 
of the ocean. Any other explanation does not do justice to the internal logic of the system. 
Vaiße∑ika philosophy is often strange, sometimes outrageous, but permeated by the urge to 
be precise and logically coherent. This does not exclude the possibility that traditional 
beliefs have occasionally been preserved in it. Yet it would be a mistake to invoke such 
traditional beliefs in order to explain features of the system without first exploring all 
systematic possibilities offered by the texts. 
 It may therefore well be true that some, or even many, Indians of ancient and 
classical India looked upon salt as being substantially the same as water. However, 
Praßastapåda the author of the Padårthadharmasa∫graha was not one of those.13 
 
 
                                                
12 WI §29: rasa˙ ∑a∂vidho madhurådi˙. 
13 After thi s art icle had gone to press,  the following half-verse from Ía∫kara ' s 
Upadeßasåhasr¥  (verse portion 1.14) came to my notice: kårakåˆy upam®dnåti  vidyå 
'bbuddhim ivo∑are .  Mayeda translate s this:  “Knowledge destroys the factors of action as [i t  
destroys] the notion that there i s water in the salt  desert .”  All  dictionarie s seem to agree 
that Ë∑ara  means “saline,  impregnated with salt” .  Did Ía∫kara not consider salt  a  form of 
water? 
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